On Posner on Copyright
Tim Wu†
INTRODUCTION
The judiciary are different than you and me, not just because they have life tenure, but because they spend years being
petitioned by real people. A judge therefore does not face problems as a logistician or an academic does but instead faces a
demand to do something for someone, based on events preceding. The resulting posture of decision tends to bring something
out, something Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once described as
“the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life.”1
We can learn more about this “secret root” of the common
law decision-making from Richard Posner’s career, for he made
his calling the addressing of hard problems from both an academic and judicial posture. When it came to copyright law (the
subject of this Essay), he was a leading advocate of an economic
approach to the law and even specified what he thought with
some doctrinal specificity. Hence the natural experiment: What
would happen when Posner came to face decades of actual cases?
What might be the effect, if any, of judging?
In 1981, the year Posner was confirmed, it would have been
easy to predict how he would decide copyright cases. The
economic approach had suggested a straightforward, even formulaic approach. Recognize a clear property right; and then
make sure it is well protected, easy to transfer, and ideally in
the hands of whoever might use it best. This prescription, to be
sure, was one Posner was willing to follow in some cases. But as
a prediction, it failed. For over the arc of his career it cannot be
denied that Posner’s copyright decisions came, over time, to be
strongly influenced not just by the questions presented but the
posture of the cases and, most of all, what he was being asked to
do and for whom.
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Maybe we can put it this way. If Posner never fully lost his
faith in economics, he did seem to lose faith in humanity’s capacity to behave itself. In other words, as a judge he increasingly rejected any Coasian presumption as to how private parties
behave—namely, efficiently—in exchange for a view suspicious
of litigants as overreaching, misbehaving creatures who, left
alone, would have the law defeat its own purposes. When it
came to copyright, that perspective led to the unlikely emergence of Richard Posner as one of the nation’s leading policemen
of the parasites, overreachers, and self-enrichers that he saw as
a plague on the copyright system and intellectual property more
generally.
In this sense, his copyright decisions seem far less driven by
any doctrinal theory as opposed to a teleological mindset. He
was dedicated to achieving the goals of the law—in this case,
rewarding legitimate creators and leaving space for others. And
as he tacked toward that goal, trimming and adjusting the law
along the way, it became clear that he ultimately put his faith in
Justice Holmes or perhaps Aristotle rather than Professors
Ronald Coase or H.L.A. Hart. Stated another way, he clearly believed that a great judge ought to rely on that internal, unconscious divining rod comprising his own judgment, evolving and
learning from experience, gradually moving the law closer to its
stated aspirations.
To witness Posner’s evolution and the development of his
copyright jurisprudence provides an opportunity (or an excuse)
for broader comment. For I hope that this Symposium on
Posner’s judicial work product will help us understand his particular contribution to the common law tradition. It is striking
that even for matters on which he had opined as an academic,
he remained committed to the judicial approach and its slow
progress toward the law’s goals, even if it meant throwing away
what he had said earlier in an academic setting. He took
Emerson’s quip about “foolish consistency”2 and made it into a
judicial philosophy. When Posner was at his best, he saw the job
as an opportunity to work on interesting or amusing problems in
the law in an effort to improve it. He trusted that internal divining rod, accepting and even embracing an evolving jurisprudence as a sign of learning and wisdom.

2
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance, in Edna H.L. Turpin, ed, Essays of Ralph
Waldo Emerson 79, 89 (Charles E. Merrill 1907).
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Understanding Posner as a great common law judge is
important in an age when that ideal has been all but replaced
with something different. The newer ideal takes dogmatism as a
virtue, positing the judge as more of a soldier, who primarily
earns honor by striking blows for his or her side. He or she is
less celebrated for evolution or wisdom as opposed to steadfast
refusal to change his or her views. It embraces a thin ideal of
individuality: one that allows a judge a taste for baseball or
bluegrass but forbids individuality when it comes to actual
judging, at least for important cases.
The rise of the soldier judge gives reason to fear that
Posner’s judicial writing may be wasted on our tedious and tendentious times. For activists on the left and right, proponents
and opponents of doctrine, Posner was always dissatisfying, for
he rarely delivered the goods in a manner that either side found
fully acceptable. Nor was he particularly popular with practicing
lawyers, most of whom have long discarded the pretense of being
part of a learned profession in the historic sense. The lawyer’s
jammed schedule creates an appetite for opinions that are easy
to read, announce neat formulas for future decisions, and combine the trappings of respectability with the depth of a children’s
textbook.
It is a pity, for while a judiciary comprised entirely of
Posners would not be ideal, we have gone too far in the opposite
direction.3 We need more judges who rely on their judgment, especially on the courts of appeals, and who try hard to improve
the law and prevent its misuse. What is hard to admit is that
there seems to be very little possibility of the next Richard
Posner becoming a member of the federal judiciary at this point,
which is a harsh verdict on the state of the Republic. For, especially in the law, we live in a time in which we celebrate the individual but recoil from any real instantiation of individuality.
And that may be why, by the very end, Posner was a common
law coelacanth, the last fish surviving from the Jurassic period,
largely swimming alone.

3
See Frank B. Cross and Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 Nw U L Rev 1437, 1439–40 (2001) (noting that law
schools teach a naïve legal model that does not acknowledge a role for judicial
individuality).
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I. COPYRIGHT, ACCORDING TO POSNER THE ACADEMIC AND
POSNER THE JUDGE
A.

Posner the Academic

As an academic, Posner was and is an influential writer in
the copyright field. He is the author of two books on the topic
(including his popular title The Little Book of Plagiarism4), along
with several articles and some blog posts. While copyright was
certainly not his sole focus (nothing was; he was also like Justice
Holmes in this regard), his works, most of which were coauthored with Professor William Landes, immediately became
standard citations for the economic analysis of copyright law.5
The theme of his early work was unsurprising: it was to stress
the economic, as opposed to the moral, function of copyright. As
he and Landes put it, they were interested in whether “copyright law can be explained as a means for promoting efficient allocation of resources.”6
In Posner’s first paper on copyright, published in 1989, he
and Landes presented a more sophisticated take on what is now
a standard idea: that copyright grants legal protections to encourage the creation of expressive works.7 As they put it, “Copyright protection—the right of the copyright’s owner to prevent
others from making copies—trades off the costs of limiting access to a work against the benefits of providing incentives to
create the work in the first place.”8 But from the beginning,
Posner also agreed that the task was complex: “For copyright
law to promote economic efficiency, its principal legal doctrines
must, at least approximately, maximize the benefits from creating additional works minus both the losses from limiting access
and the costs of administering copyright protection.”9

4

Richard A. Posner, The Little Book of Plagiarism (Pantheon 2007).
See, for example, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325, 325–33, 344–53 (1989); William M.
Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U Chi L Rev 471,
473–75 (2003); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of
Intellectual Property Law 37 (Belknap 2003); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner,
The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law 8 (AEI-Brookings 2004). See also
William F. Patry and Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of
Eldred, 92 Cal L Rev 1639, 1643 (2004).
6
Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 325 (cited in note 5).
7
Id at 332.
8
Id at 326.
9
Id.
5
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Of course, by the late 1980s, the central economic paradox
created by copyright was not unrecognized. It was implicit in
Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay’s 1841 speech that described
copyright as a form of monopoly—“a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers.”10 But with a few exceptions
(among them a famous paper by then-Professor Stephen Breyer
that questioned the very existence of copyright11), most of the
writings began and ended with Macaulay’s analysis. Posner and
Landes’s contribution was to be far more precise about what
they took to be the various costs associated with both the reproduction of expressive works and their creation.12 And they also
thought copyright protection could go too far, for “beyond some
level copyright protection may actually be counterproductive by
raising the cost of expression.”13 However, consistent with
Posner’s earlier tendency to find an efficiency rationale lurking
behind most of positive law, in his examination of copyright doctrine, he did not suggest that the rules were random or interest
group driven but rather that they reflected some inchoate yearning for efficient outcomes.14
This academic writing set the stage for Posner’s judicial career, to which I now turn.
B.

Posner the Judge

Posner the academic had presented a flat, almost purposely
dry account of copyright’s function in the economy. But Posner
the judge was another story. Perhaps it was the cases, or the
way he thought about things, but his judicial copyright career
was far more colorful. And while it is hard to summarize twentysix-odd cases, his most prominent contributions dwelt on a key

10 A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons on the 5th of February, 1841, in The
Miscellaneous Writings and Speeches of Lord Macaulay 609, 613 (Longmans, Green,
Reader & Dyer 1871).
11 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv L Rev 281, 321 (1970).
12 Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 332 (cited in note 5).
13 Id.
14 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 98 (Little, Brown 1973) (“The
common law method is to allocate responsibilities between people engaged in interacting
activities in such a way as to maximize the joint value, or, what amounts to the same
thing, minimize the joint cost of the activities.”). By 2004, Posner had begun to suggest
that the expansion of copyright was a function of interest group behavior, an assertion in
tension with the older suggestions of efficiency. See Landes and Posner, Political
Economy of Intellectual Property at 8 (cited in note 5).
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relationship: that between primary and secondary authors, or
what can be described as the problem of “follow-on” works.
To understand this problem, consider that any successful
work—a play, a sculpture, a novel—is likely to yield follow-on
works, such as movie versions, reviews, sequels that use the
same characters, guides, translations, parodies, and so on. That
fact yields a challenging question for copyright law—namely,
which follow-ons should belong to the original author and which
should be free to secondary authors to create without permission? Anyone is free to stage Hamlet, but what about writing a
new Sherlock Holmes story? These cases put the judge in the
difficult position of weighing the interests of two intended beneficiaries of the law.
Copyright law handles this area imperfectly and inconsistently with a mixture of doctrines. One is the “idea-expression”
dichotomy, which allows authors to borrow any “ideas” from existing works but not the “expression.”15 Posner the academic described it this way: “If an economist reprints Ronald Coase’s article on social cost without permission, he is an infringer; but if
he expounds the Coase Theorem in his own words, he is not.”16
Another doctrine, important for fictional works, is the granting
of copyright in characters, which allows an author to control the
franchise and merchandizing.17 A third doctrine is the adaptation or derivative work right, which gives the original author the
right to any adaptation of the original (like a film version of a
novel)18 or any other way that it might be “recast, transformed,
or adapted.”19 The fourth and final doctrine is the fair use doctrine, which creates an affirmative defense for certain types of
follow-ons, such as reviews or parodies.20 Hence a critic is free,
under the fair use doctrine, to write a lengthy review of a nonfiction book and even to quote liberally from it, even though there

15

See 17 USC § 102(a)–(b).
Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law at 91 (cited
in note 5).
17 See, for example, Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of
Copyright, 125 Harv L Rev 683, 742–50 (2012) (discussing character copyright and a notable Posner opinion on the topic).
18 See generally Amy B. Cohen, When Does a Work Infringe the Derivative Works
Right of a Copyright Owner?, 17 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 623 (1999) (delving into the
intricacies of the doctrine).
19 17 USC § 101.
20 See, for example, Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil
Society, 106 Yale L J 283, 304 (1996).
16
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could be no review without the book and even though the original author hates the review and wishes it did not exist.
Posner the judge would go on to make important contributions to the character copyright doctrine, primarily through his
writing on characters, derivative works, and fair use.
II. CHARACTER COPYRIGHTS
Sherlock Holmes, Dorothy (from The Wizard of Oz), and
Medieval Hellspawn are the featured characters in Posner’s
most important copyright opinions, which center on the role of
character copyrights.21
Copyright is designed to encourage the creation of “works,”
which was originally understood as “maps, charts, and books.”22
But at some point, possibly in the 1920s, it became clear that
the characters in a fictional work might enjoy their own copyrights.23 That is to say, it became clear that a character might
enjoy a legal life separate from the work it was found in.24 That
idea was most evident in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand,
who, by declining to protect stock characters, implied that others
might be protected.25
If once trivial, character copyrights have grown in value and
become perhaps the most valuable class of copyright. No one
remembers the plot of the first comic to feature Superman, but
everyone knows “The Man of Steel.” A film like The Avengers,
has a value that owes little to the originality of its setting or plot
(a villain is plotting to take over the world) as opposed to the inclusion of luminous heroes like Thor, Iron Man, the Hulk, and
Black Widow.
Over his tenure, Posner assigned himself or was assigned
just about every character copyright case to come before the
Seventh Circuit. His decisions are a good place to witness the

21 Klinger v Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd, 755 F3d 496 (7th Cir 2014) (Klinger I);
Gracen v Bradford Exchange, 698 F2d 300 (7th Cir 1983); Gaiman v McFarlane, 360 F3d
644 (7th Cir 2004).
22 Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat 124, 124.
23 See, for example, King Features Syndicate v Fleischer, 299 F 533, 535 (2d Cir
1924) (holding that a doll version of a cartoon horse violated copyright protection, and
noting that taking the substance of a work or an idea and producing it in a different medium still violated copyright protection).
24 For an explanation that relies on the role played by characters in infringement
analysis, see Zahr K. Said, Fixing Copyright in Characters: Literary Perspectives on a
Legal Problem, 35 Cardozo L Rev 769, 776–80 (2013).
25 See Nichols v Universal Pictures Corp, 45 F2d 119, 121 (1930).
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effect of judging, for the decisions, while reflecting the competitive and economic consequences of granting character copyright,
are driven also by insights about the process of authorship itself
and rumination on just what a character is. Ultimately, the
judgments cannot seem to be divorced from the justice of the
situation—who was trying to get what and how entitled to relief
they seemed.
Posner’s first character-related copyright decision came very
early in his career and centered on Dorothy from The Wizard of
Oz.26 The case revolved around a woman named Jorie Gracen,
who had won a contest to paint Dorothy as portrayed by Judy
Garland for a series of collectors’ plates.27 Gracen could not
reach an agreement to reproduce her painting with the manufacturer that MGM had licensed to make the plates, so the
manufacturer hired another artist to copy Gracen’s painting,
reasoning that Gracen did not hold any enforceable rights anyhow.28 She felt differently and sued for infringement.29
But had Gracen actually copied the character of Dorothy?
Posner might have decided the case by holding that Dorothy was
nothing more than a stock character, a courageous but otherwise
unremarkable little girl from Kansas whose taste for shiny
shoes did not distinguish her. But he presumed that the character was copyrighted because, foreshadowing Posner’s later work
on visual characters, she was depicted in a still photograph of
Judy Garland as Dorothy from the MGM film.30
But this, as Posner might say, was an aside. Posner’s far
more important and influential character opinion was a tricky
case centered on the Spawn comic book series, the famous author Neil Gaiman, and the artist/publisher Todd McFarlane.31 It
is both an important case and also one in which the line between

26

See Gracen, 698 F2d at 305.
Id at 301.
28 Id.
29 Id at 301–02.
30 The Gracen opinion is also important for its elevation of problems of evidence
and proof in copyright law. In adopting a Second Circuit rule demanding greater originality in derivative works, Posner noticed that such requirements kept at bay what
might otherwise become difficult problems of proof. Gracen, 698 F2d at 301–02. And this
way of thinking about the law, implicit perhaps in other opinions, was novel as a rationale for a copyright rule. Professor Douglas Lichtman would later elevate it to a more
general theory of copyright law, suggesting that the evidentiary function helped judges
understand many otherwise puzzling parts of copyright doctrine. Douglas Lichtman,
Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 Duke L J 683, 708–10 (2003).
31 Gaiman, 360 F3d at 648–49.
27
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Posner’s economic and pragmatic instincts seems particularly
sharp.
Comic author and illustrator McFarlane, who made his
name through his work on Spider-Man in the late 1980s, had by
the 1990s left the majors (DC and Marvel) to become an independent comic book publisher.32 In 1992, he launched a new series centered on a character named Spawn, whose life story,
Judge Posner tells us, “is an affecting one.”33 Spawn (whose
given name was Al) was a member of an elite military unit who
was betrayed and killed after uncovering a dark conspiracy.34
However, Spawn made a literal deal with the devil to return to
Earth and became a “handpicked Hellspawn . . . remade (a full
makeover, as we’ll see) and infused with Hell-born energy.”35
Spawn the character clearly belonged to McFarlane, who
conceived him and first drew him. (In his first appearance, he
had long spiky fingernails, wore a red cape and chains, and manipulated green energy fields.) The complications began in 1992,
when McFarlane invited Gaiman to write an issue of the Spawn
series based on only an oral promise to treat him better than the
“big guys.”36 Gaiman immediately added three new characters to
the comic, naming them Medieval Spawn, Angela, and Count
Nicholas Cogliostro, and wrote dialogue for them.37 Medieval
Spawn was an earlier incarnation of the main character described above—like the original, he also wore a red cape and
chains, but carried gigantic medieval weapons and rode a
horse.38 Angela was a new villain, a “warrior angel and villain”
who wore a dominatrix outfit and carried a lance.39 Cogliostro
was a “wisened [sic] sage.”40 To complicate matters, while the
characters were thought up by Gaiman, they were actually
drawn by McFarlane.41 All of the new characters, particularly
Angela, were popular and became valuable, and over time the
Gaiman-McFarlane team began to argue over who actually
owned copyright in the newly created characters. McFarlane

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Id at 649.
Id.
Id.
Gaiman, 360 F3d at 649.
Id.
Id at 650.
Id at 657.
Gaiman, 360 F3d at 657.
Id.
Id at 658.
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conceded that Gaiman was a joint owner of Angela but not the
other two.42 They could not agree, ultimately leading to litigation.
One way that a simple law-and-economics analysis might be
used to approach this problem is simply as one of asset allocation. Consider that the three characters—Medieval Spawn,
Angela, and Cogliostro—can be seen as little more than new
assets spawned by the original work, like three calves born of
the same cow.43 It is a typical dictate in the economic analysis of
law to suggest simple rules, clear to the parties ex ante, that allocate the assets to whoever might most easily put them to productive use.44 In this case, the party who would put the assets to
the most productive use was clearly McFarlane, the publisher
and also the originator of the Spawn series. Another approach is
to create rights around which private bargains could be struck,
in Coasian fashion. Professor Harold Demsetz argued that the
economic function of property was to grant rights so as to internalize any externalities45—well, what else was Gaiman’s effort
to grab the characters for himself? Hence the case for leaving
the assets with the original rights holder and allowing parties to
contract around that reality if they wished.
Following these principles, Posner could have just reversed
the jury verdict and told Gaiman that he should have gotten a
signed contract and to not bother the court with his pleas for ex
post justice. That outcome might have reflected a classic
Coasian refrain: having strengthened the rights, the lesson
would be learned, and future parties would surely understand
the necessity of bargaining in advance to reach a Pareto optimal
outcome.46
But Posner declined to write that opinion. Instead, he took
the occasion for a detailed dive into the nuances of creative
collaboration and the challenging common law question of what
might make a character distinct enough to merit copyright protection. The opinion took Gaiman’s side, in part because

42

Id at 650.
See Randall G. Holcombe, The Coase Theorem, Applied to Markets and
Government, 23 Indep Rev 249, 250–51 (2018) (discussing asset allocation as applied to
markets).
44 See id.
45 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347,
350 (1967).
46 Pareto optimality refers to a situation of asset allocation in which it is impossible to
move resources around to make any one individual better off without making another
worse off. See, for example, Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 348–49 (cited in note 5).
43
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Posner seemed to take him seriously as a creator who deserved
the rewards of the law.47 In short, Posner discarded any
“[s]imple rules for a complex world”48 in favor of who anyone
could see was a meritorious author, the actual subject of the
copyright laws.
Finding that Gaiman was the copyright owner required several doctrinal innovations (and also giving Gaiman a pass on a
tricky statute of limitations challenge49). One doctrinal innovation concerned the joint ownership of copyright. Other circuits,
including the Second, had created a simple rule suggesting that
one could not be a joint author without making a contribution
that was separately copyrightable and, in fact, Posner himself
had stated a version of that rule in an earlier case.50 It is a rule
meant to prevent more minor figures—copy editors, factcheckers, and others—from claiming to be joint authors of the
works to which they contribute.51 It therefore left an easy way to
knock Gaiman out and send a message of tough love: next time,
get a contract.
But Posner, himself a frequent coauthor, was not willing to
accept a rule that took so narrow a view of what counted as an
authorial contribution (one that would deny his own coauthor,
Professor Landes, joint copyright). So Posner held that,
whatever the merits of that rule in other contexts, it went too far
if it denied joint copyright when combined efforts were necessary
to produce one work—for that would be “peeling the onion until
it disappeared.”52 He suggested:
Here is a typical case from academe. One professor has brilliant ideas but can’t write; another is an excellent writer,
but his ideas are commonplace. So they collaborate on an
academic article, one contributing the ideas, which are not
copyrightable, and the other the prose envelope. . . . Their
intent to be the joint owners of the copyright in the article
would be plain, and that should be enough to constitute
them joint authors.53

47

See Gaiman, 360 F3d at 654–55.
Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 21 (Harvard 1995).
49 See Gaiman, 360 F3d at 652–53.
50 Seshadri v Kasraian, 130 F3d 798, 803 (7th Cir 1997), citing Childress v Taylor,
945 F2d 500, 507 (2d Cir 1991).
51 See Thomson v Larson, 147 F3d 195, 200 (2d Cir 1998).
52 Gaiman, 360 F3d at 658–59.
53 Id at 659.
48
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This ruling made Gaiman a joint owner of Medieval
Spawn.54 But Posner also faced the assertion that Cogliostro,
“the wisened [sic] sage,” was merely a stock figure and therefore
not subject to ownership by anyone.55 I have already discussed
the fact that in some works, such as The Avengers or, for that
matter, the James Bond films, the characters are “the story being told,” meaning that the stories amount to little more than
the characters in them.56 But there are also successful works
that have no memorable or copyrightable characters. Jurassic
Park was a popular film, but the only characters of note were
the dinosaurs, who could not be copyrighted as such. Pulp
Fiction was among the most acclaimed films of the 1990s, but,
as the title suggests, every one of its characters was stock or,
more accurately, did not go much beyond the actors who played
them.
Posner took the opportunity to follow Judge Learned Hand’s
lead and put his own gloss on the standard that a character be
distinctive.57 Judge Hand wrote that there could be no copyright
in “a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the
household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amorous
of his mistress.”58 Posner took the opportunity to extend Judge
Hand’s Shakespeare-centered list of unprotectable characters by
adding “a drunken suburban housewife, a gesticulating
Frenchman, a fire-breathing dragon, a talking cat, a Prussian
officer who wears a monocle and clicks his heels, [or] a masked
magician.”59
But then what of Cogliostro, a stock character if there ever
was one? Here’s how Gaiman conceived of him: “[Y]ou think he’s
a drunken bum,” but “[h]e’s some kind of mysterious stranger
who knows things.”60 There was some visual description too: “[A]
really old bum, a skinny, balding old man, with a grubby
greyish-yellow beard, like a skinny santa claus.”61 Even with all
of that, we don’t have much, almost certainly not enough to protect. The “unexpectedly knowledgeable old wino” would, on its
54

Id at 661–62.
Id at 657, 660.
56 Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc, v Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc, 216 F2d
945, 950 (9th Cir 1954).
57 See Nichols, 45 F2d at 121.
58 Id.
59 Gaiman, 360 F3d at 660.
60 Id at 658.
61 Id.
55
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face, seem to be a good addition to Judge Hand’s and Posner’s
list of stock characters.62
But instead of reversing on Cogliostro, Posner made yet
another innovative doctrinal move. He decided that McFarlane,
in the process of giving Cogliostro a specific and distinct appearance (when drawing him), crossed the line and made Cogliostro
into a copyrightable character, of which Gaiman was now the
joint owner.63 Along the way, Posner made explicit and implicit
distinctions between the copyrightability of visual and literary
characters.64
Posner seemed to be driven by the subtle differences between a visual and written medium that were also implicit in
the Dorothy/Wizard of Oz case and were also captured by what I
call the “King Lear/Grimace paradox.”65 Most of us would consider King Lear a more interesting and well-developed character
than, say, Grimace, the purple McDonald’s mascot. But to copyright law, Grimace’s depiction makes him the more distinct
character, and the easier one to gain protection for, as compared
with Lear, who might be described as “a wealthy but angry old
father with a weakness for flattery.” Here is how Posner put the
point: “A reader of unillustrated fiction completes the work in
his mind; the reader of a comic book or the viewer of a movie is
passive.”66 He added a public service message: “That is why kids
lose a lot when they don’t read fiction, even when the movies
and television that they watch are aesthetically superior.”67
The Cogliostro decision might have been wrong and was
surely a close call. It seems to create the risk of encouraging
actors to claim copyright in characters that they visually embody (consider Mark Hamill claiming ownership in Luke
Skywalker).68 It also might seem to overcredit Gaiman, who, after all, hadn’t really done much besides give the description
above and write some dialogue. Yet it certainly marked, for

62

Id at 660.
Gaiman, 360 F3d at 661.
64 The distinction was arguably implicit in decisions such as Walt Disney
Productions v Air Pirates, 581 F2d 751, 753–55 (9th Cir 1978).
65 The paradox is one that I use in my copyright class.
66 Gaiman, 360 F3d at 661.
67 Id.
68 But see Garcia v Google, Inc, 786 F3d 733, 737 (9th Cir 2015) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s decision to deny relief to an actress seeking to copyright her performance in a film).
63
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Posner, a decidedly more nuanced and sophisticated approach to
follow-on authorship cases, echoed in his academic writing.
It might be worth noting that, at around the same time as
the Hellspawn opinion, Posner released a book, The Economic
Structure of Intellectual Property Law,69 and a monograph, The
Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law.70 In the latter,
implicitly breaking with the earlier premise that the law was efficient, he dwelt on public choice explanations for copyright’s expansion and the “inherent asymmetry” between the primary and
secondary authors, based on the difference between “the value
that creators of intellectual property place on having property
rights and the value that would-be copiers place on the freedom
to copy without having to obtain a license.”71 So perhaps he was
beginning to have his suspicions.
Posner’s latent concerns about the conduct of copyright
owners played out most dramatically in the 2014 case of
Sherlock Holmes, the famous detective, in an opinion with
particularly important implications for so-called fan fiction and
other follow-on authorship.72 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, wrote some sixty
Sherlock Holmes stories.73 By the 2010s, copyright in all but ten
of the stories had expired.74 Nonetheless, when other authors
sought to use those characters, the estate demanded royalties,
claiming that it still owned copyright in the characters of
Sherlock Holmes and John Watson, his sidekick.75 An editor of a
series of new Sherlock Holmes stories sued Doyle’s estate,
asking the court to declare Sherlock and Watson to be in the
public domain.76
You might wonder: If the copyrights had expired, how could
the estate possibly claim copyright in the characters? The estate
posited that the characters had fully developed only in the last
ten stories—the ones in which copyright still subsisted—because
in these last stories, the characters had become “round,” unlike

69 See generally Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Intellectual Property
Law (cited in note 5).
70 See generally Landes and Posner, Political Economy of Intellectual Property
(cited in note 5).
71 Id at 14.
72 Klinger I, 755 F3d at 498.
73 Id at 497.
74 Id.
75 Id at 497–98.
76 Klinger I, 755 F3d at 498.
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the “flatter” Holmes and Watson who were in the first fifty.77
“Repeatedly at the oral argument,” Posner wrote, “the estate’s
lawyer dramatized the concept of a ‘round’ character by describing large circles with his arms.”78 Hence, according to the estate,
the further delineation of the characters in the last ten stories
either kept them in copyright or created copyright in them for
the first time. This argument suggested that further development might even do so indefinitely should the estate continue to
write new Sherlock Holmes stories every so often.79
While that might sound like overreaching, the estate’s
strongest policy arguments could be found in a 2003 paper by
none other than Posner himself and coauthor Landes.80 The two
made the novel argument—blasphemous to the copyright academy—that there might be good economic reason to allow certain
copyrights, such as those of famous characters, to subsist indefinitely.81 Using the example of Mickey Mouse, Posner and Landes
argued that a valuable character thrown into the public domain
might become “overgrazed” and lose all commercial value.82
If because copyright had expired anyone were free to incorporate the Mickey Mouse character in a book, movie, song,
etc., the value of the character might plummet. Not only
would the public rapidly tire of Mickey Mouse, but his image would be blurred, as some authors portrayed him as a
Casanova, others as catmeat, others as an animal-rights
advocate, still others as the henpecked husband of Minnie.
In effect, there would be both a movement along and shift
downward in the demand curve . . . until Mickey Mouse’s
commercial value was zero.83
It is no stretch to suggest that such overgrazing might ruin
Sherlock Holmes; hence Posner’s paper clearly counsels for deciding in the estate’s favor. But Posner the judge effectively decided against Posner the academic. He ruled against the estate,
suggesting that its defense “border[ed] on the quixotic”84 and
even forced it to pay attorneys’ fees.
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id at 501–02.
Id.
Id at 503.
Landes and Posner, 70 U Chi L Rev at 474–75 (cited in note 5).
Id.
Id at 484.
Id at 487–88.
See Klinger I, 755 F3d at 503.
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Facing a choice between legitimate follow-on authors
wishing to put Sherlock Holmes in new adventures and an
estate demanding money that would not go to Doyle himself,
who was long dead, Posner the judge did not see it as a hard
case. Instead, it was outrageous overreaching—copyright
trolling.85 (In his award of attorney fees, he went on at some
length about the problem of copyright trolls extorting money on
the basis of nothing.86)
But what about the argument made by Posner the
academic?87 Perhaps out of a sense of duty, Posner raised his
own theory, without citation,88 as an argument against his own
opinion that the estate could have argued but didn’t.
We can imagine the Doyle estate being concerned that a
modern author might write a story in which Sherlock
Holmes was disparaged (perhaps by being depicted as a
drug dealer—he was of course a cocaine user—or as an idiot
detective like Inspector Clouseau of the Pink Panther
movies).89
But Posner the judge summarily dismissed the arguments of
Posner the academic by pointing out that the argument lacked
legal support and, in any case, that the estate was not actually
concerned about disparaging uses. Whether this is the only time
Posner the judge dismissed the arguments of Posner the
academic I do not know, but it was certainly among the clearer
examples.
III. DERIVATIVE WORKS AND FAIR USE
A second way that the line between the first and later authors is divided is through the twin doctrines of derivative works
and fair use.90 The former is an exceptionally broad right that
gives the original author the exclusive rights over any adaptation of the original work—any way it might be “recast, transformed, or adapted.”91 The classic examples were the play based
85 See id (noting that a lengthy copyright protection period would result in massive
payments to the Doyle estate in licensing fees).
86 See Klinger v Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd, 761 F3d 789, 791–92 (7th Cir 2014)
(Klinger II).
87 Landes and Posner, 70 U Chi L Rev at 475 (cited in note 5).
88 Posner did not include citations to his academic writing in his judicial opinions.
89 Klinger I, 755 F3d at 503.
90 17 USC §§ 106(2), 107.
91 17 USC § 101.
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on the novel, the translation, the new musical arrangement, and
the abridgment.92 But that right can be in tension, and even
sometimes at war, with the fair use doctrine, which suggests
that a secondary author may adapt the work into follow-on
works, such as book reviews, news reporting, parodies, and,
more recently, so-called remix art.93 As this brief discussion
might suggest, what counts as an adaptation, and what is fair
use, is not exactly a straightforward matter.
Posner’s second major derivative work case was a 2000 case
involving the singer Prince (or, as he was then known, “the
Artist Formerly Known as Prince”) and the symbol that he used
to represent himself, which is unpronounceable but resembles
an ankh.94
FIGURE 1: SYMBOL CHOSEN BY PRINCE TO REPRESENT HIMSELF

92
93
94

17 USC § 101.
17 USC § 107.
See generally Pickett v Prince, 207 F3d 402 (7th Cir 2000).
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FIGURE 2: GUITAR RESEMBLING PRINCE’S CHOSEN SYMBOL

In that case, a man named Ferdinand Pickett, inspired by
the symbol, created a guitar in the shape of it.95 According to
Pickett, he managed to show his guitar to Prince. To his surprise
and anger, not long thereafter, Prince appeared in public with
just such a guitar, which suggested to Pickett that his brilliant
idea had been stolen.96
Despite the fact that the second man was himself a creator
in a way, Posner held for Prince without much difficulty.97 The
law supported such an outcome, but Posner grounded the decision on a premise drawn from his academic writing: it was sensible to concentrate all rights in Prince, for “[c]oncentrating the
right to make derivative works in the owner of the original work
prevents what might otherwise be an endless series of infringement suits posing insoluble difficulties of proof.”98 It was an echo
of the Dorothy opinion, and the case became a lesson in the importance of preventing opportunistic litigation by those who (often in earnest) imagine that they really were the first to come

95
96
97
98

Id at 404.
Id.
Id at 407.
Pickett, 207 F3d at 406. See also id:

Consider two translations into English of a book originally published in
French. The two translations are bound to be very similar and it will be
difficult to establish whether they are very similar because one is a copy of the
other or because both are copies of the same foreign-language original.
Whether Prince’s guitar is a copy of his copyrighted symbol or a copy of
Pickett’s guitar is likewise not a question that the methods of litigation can
readily answer with confidence.
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up with, say, the idea that Pygmalion might make a really good
play.
But by following that narrative (one stressed in his
academic writing99), the opinion avoids several important questions. Was the guitar version clearly an adaptation of Prince’s
copyrighted symbol and therefore actually even actionable at all,
whether by Pickett or by Prince? The statute does not so decree,100 and the functional nature of guitars might seem to caution against it. Might the better answer be to disarm everyone
who might want to make guitars out of unpronounceable symbols—and just leave copyright out of it?
It is hard to escape the conclusion that the posture of the
lawsuit helped drive the result. Famous creators always attract
a certain class of followers who come to believe that they played
an overlooked role in the creative process and have been shafted
by “the powers that be.” J.K. Rowling, the author of the Harry
Potter series, has been sued repeatedly by authors who believe
that they, in fact, were the first to invent the concept of schoolchildren who practice magic. (Among the plaintiffs are the authors of Willy the Wizard and The Legend of Rah and
Muggles.101) Like a conspiracy theory, the idea that one is the
“real” inventor of something famous and successful, once embedded in the psyche, seems impossible to dislodge. And while
we do not know Pickett’s full story, his narrative suggests a man
who was dangerously close to this category. If given rights, he
might become like the dog in Justice Holmes’s The Common
Law, who “will not allow himself to be dispossessed, either by
force or fraud, of what he holds, without trying to get it back
again.”102
Things might have been different were Pickett a harmless
hobbyist, a designer of curio guitars who had been hunted down
by Prince or, even worse, the Prince estate. And this difference
helps explain the famous Beanie Baby case, Ty, Inc v
Publications International, Ltd (Ty II),103 decided three years
later. Beanie Babies are small stuffed animals that, in the
99 See, for example, Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Intellectual Property
Law at 109–11 (cited in note 5).
100 17 USC § 103(a).
101 See, for example, Harry Potter Author Sued for Plagiarism (The Guardian, Mar
17, 2000), archived at http://perma.cc/U4GC-MWAZ; J.K. Rowling Sued for Plagiarism
(The Star, Feb 18, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/X3AC-HLYY.
102 Holmes, The Common Law at 192 (cited in note 1).
103 292 F3d 512 (7th Cir 2002).
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1990s, became popular collectors’ items.104 They are manufactured by Ty, Inc and, in an earlier case, Posner had upheld
copyright of one of Ty’s pigs, named “Squealer,” as a “soft sculpture.”105 Publications International, Ltd (PIL), a publisher, produced a series of independent guides to the Beanie Babies collection, which included the Beanie Babies Collector’s Guide and For
the Love of Beanie Babies.106 But Ty didn’t like PIL’s unlicensed
guides, for it granted copyright licenses to publishers for a competing set of guides, in which criticism of the Beanie Babies was
forbidden; and Ty sued PIL for copyright infringement.107
The Beanie Baby case is Posner’s most important contribution to the problem of follow-on authorship. It works one economic concept to great advantage: the idea that some follow-ons
are complements to the original work—that is, they make it
more valuable. Consider, for example, Internet recaps of television shows or a layman’s guide to Professor Martin Heidegger’s
Being and Time—both add value to the original work as opposed
to substituting for it. Posner took the view that follow-ons that
make the original more valuable, as opposed to substituting for
it, ought to be permitted. In fact, in Ty II, Posner casually elevated the distinction between complement and substitute into a
controlling theory for fair use. “[W]e may say,” and Posner does,
“that copying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in
the sense that nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, but
copying that is a substitute for the copyrighted work (in the sense
that nails are substitutes for pegs or screws) . . . is not fair use.”108
Posner’s complement/substitute line is an elegant formulation that, in a sentence or two, would create a new order for a
doctrine that is widely regarded as unpredictable and chaotic.
Unfortunately, it is only barely consistent with what other
courts (including the Supreme Court) have prescribed for fair
use cases—namely, a methodical working through of four factors
specified in the statute.109 Posner, who hates nothing more than
an incoherent balancing test in which factors are said to “point”
one way or another (like a lawyer’s Ouija board), dealt with that

104
105
106
107
108
109

Id at 515.
Ty, Inc v GMA Accessories, Inc, 132 F3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir 1997) (Ty I).
Ty II, 292 F3d at 515.
Id at 520.
Id at 517.
See 17 USC § 107; Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 US 569, 577 (1994).
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problem by announcing that “the four factors are a checklist of
things to be considered rather than a formula for decision.”110
Whether other circuits will be bold enough to accept
Posner’s complement/substitute approach remains to be seen, as
the four-factor analysis he hated has an almost magnetic appeal
for some judges and academics. And there’s also another problem with Posner’s complement/substitute approach. Many of the
adaptation or derivative work rights—granted to the original
creator by the statute—are also complements to the original
work. But if complements are supposed to be fair use, how can
they also be derivative works? (Consider that a translation of
Harry Potter into Japanese also makes the original more valuable because more people can read it—but the law clearly makes
translations a derivative work.)
Posner addresses this by saying that works that substitute
for derivative works of the original are also not usually to be regarded as fair use either. But it leaves open the question of what
counts as a derivative work in the first place—a matter that
Posner, along with Judge Frank Easterbrook, has been among
the few judges to really think hard about.111
That leads us to Posner’s second innovation in Ty II: a narrowing of the derivative works doctrine from what at least some
courts had taken it to be. He achieves this by a categorical holding that a collector’s guide to a series of copyrighted works are
not derivative works at all, a matter important to the world of
follow-on writing. Posner seems to have forced this concession on
Ty’s lawyers, for he seemed to take it as obvious, comparing the
collector’s guide to a book review.112 Posner said, relying on the
statutory language:
A guide to Parisian restaurants is not a recasting, transforming, or adapting of Parisian restaurants. Indeed, a collectors’ guide is very much like a book review, which is a
guide to a book and which no one supposes is a derivative
work. Both the book review and the collectors’ guide are
critical and evaluative as well as purely informational; and
ownership of a copyright does not confer a legal right to control public evaluation of the copyrighted work.113

110
111
112
113

Ty II, 292 F3d at 522.
See, for example, Lee v A.R.T. Co, 125 F3d 580, 581 (7th Cir 1997) (Easterbrook).
Ty II, 292 F3d at 520.
Id at 520–21.
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This way of thinking breaks from other courts, which have
sometimes been willing to blithely assume that anything associated with the original work belongs to the original author, even
though the statutory language doesn’t say so. The Second
Circuit held a trivia game based on the television show Seinfeld
to be infringing,114 even though a trivia game is not mentioned in
the statute and it is hard to see it as “recast[ing], transform[ing],
or adapt[ing]”115 the original show. It is hard, if not impossible,
to see how the game hurts the creators of the show and easy to
see that it might add to the enjoyment of die-hard fans. The
same court also held a guidebook to the Twin Peaks television
show, which was popular in the early 1990s, to be a derivative
work,116 and a New York district court held an answer book to a
mathematics textbook to be a derivative work.117
But Posner broke hard with all of these decisions by holding
guides not to be derivatives of the original work, a view that has
had an influence over prominent cases.118 This, the better view of
the derivative work doctrine, remains important for the various
online encyclopedias that now seem to follow every popular
novel, film, or television show, and also for the Internet recaps
that are beloved by some television fans.
And so a victory for the collector’s guide but a loss for the
guitar maker. As they say in law school, how can these cases be
distinguished? It ought not be overlooked that, in the Prince
case, Pickett wasn’t the defendant—rather, he was trying to get
money out of Prince for purportedly stealing his design for the
guitar. In contrast, Ty’s campaign against PIL was unsympathetic in numerous ways. Ty is revealed to be the overreaching
114 Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc v Carol Publishing Group, Inc, 150 F3d 132, 139
(2d Cir 1998). Posner’s effort to distinguish the case is tortured because he struggles to
understand why the Second Circuit viewed the trivia game at issue in that case as
frivolous.
115 17 USC § 101.
116 Twin Peaks Productions, Inc v Publications International, Ltd, 996 F2d 1366,
1373 (2d Cir 1993).
117 Addison-Wesley Publishing Co v Brown, 223 F Supp 219, 220 (EDNY 1963). See
also Worlds of Wonder, Inc v Vector Intercontinental, Inc, 653 F Supp 135, 139–40 (ND
Ohio 1986); Worlds of Wonder, Inc v Veritel Learning Systems, Inc, 658 F Supp 351, 355–
56 (ND Tex 1986).
118 His approach to derivative works would later be followed over circuit precedent
in the Second Circuit in a well-publicized case centered on The Lexicon, a fan-written
guidebook about the world of Harry Potter. See Warner Brothers Entertainment Inc v
RDR Books, 575 F Supp 2d 513, 519–22, 538–39 (SDNY 2008), quoting Ty II, 292 F3d at
521. See also Tim Wu, Fan Feud (New Yorker, May 12, 2008), archived at
http://perma.cc/5RWN-SYZR.
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villain, the monopolist of the micro–teddy bear market, silencing
its critics and eliminating its competitors, its steel fist obscured
by velvet and stuffing.
“Ty doesn’t like criticism,” Posner said at one point,119 and
he also took pains to point out that while Ty does license guides,
it retains veto rights over the text and requires its licensees to
print a misleading statement on their guides that indicates that
the publication is not affiliated with Ty.120 Such deception, which
might be a minor violation of consumer protection laws,121
prompted Posner to mention the doctrine of copyright misuse
and the threat of stripping Ty’s copyrights altogether.122
These criticisms of Ty’s behavior are of a piece with other
copyright opinions and a later Posner theme: the punishment
and shaming of overreaching rights holders. The Sherlock
Holmes opinions discussed earlier put the estate in a very
unflattering light by portraying it as trolling for dollars on the
back of an expired copyright. The same can be found in Posner’s
later patent decisions and, notably, in the case of Apple, Inc v
Motorola, Inc.123 In that case, sitting as a district judge, Posner
dismissed all of the patent claims with prejudice in an opinion
that chastised both parties and questioned the patent system
itself.124 And in another copyright case, Posner heaped scorn on a
firm named Assessment Technologies, which had tried to use a
software copyright to control valuable data that was not
copyrightable.125 It was nothing, he wrote, but a situation in
which an “owner is trying to secrete the data in its copyrighted
program,” and “[i]t would be appalling if such an attempt could
succeed.”126
CONCLUSION
So there we have it. Posner’s earlier copyright opinions are
marked by a sensitivity to some of the subtler costs in the copyright system. In his later opinions, Posner slowly grew into a
119

Ty II, 292 F3d at 520.
Id.
121 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat 717, 719 (1914), codified as amended
at 15 USC § 45(a)(1).
122 Ty II, 292 F3d at 520.
123 869 F Supp 2d 901 (ND Ill 2012).
124 Id at 908–10, 916–20.
125 Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v WIREdata, Inc, 350 F3d 640, 641–42 (7th
Cir 2003).
126 Id.
120
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policeman of the public domain and an enemy of copyright trolls
and lazy estates. But even as he became a critic of the way in
which intellectual property was being used, it remains that
Richard Posner never came to lose his basic faith in granting
property rights to authors, based on the basic economic arguments that favor propertization. Instead, what his exposure to
the cases seemed to destroy was any faith that Coasian bargaining in this context would inevitably yield efficient outcomes.
To the author Posner once said (speaking of a well known
academic figure), “He’s not very smart—but he does know a lot.”
That grudging respect captures something both about Posner
and the effects of judging on him. For despite his intelligence
and capacity for abstract reasoning, he grew to gain respect for
the kind of knowledge that is the product of lengthy immersion
in something, and judging, for him, was just such an immersion
in the unusual world of American litigation. In time, he felt he
began to know more about why people brought lawsuits, and
thereby gained a different and more nuanced sense of who was
deserving of judicial solicitude and who deserved a dressing
down. As for the latter, Posner always held a special kind of disdain for those who combined their self-interest with claims of an
infallibility more common in religious settings. That is what
made inevitable the collision between himself and certain holders of intellectual property.

